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In  this  paper  we  examine  whether,  and  how,  welfare  economics  should  incorporate  the 
insights from happiness and satisfaction studies. Our main point is that measuring well-being 
by reported satisfaction levels can come in conáict with individualsíjudgments about their 
own lives and that these individual judgments should be respected. We propose an alternative 
measure of welfare in terms of equivalent incomes that does respect individual preferences. 
Satisfaction  surveys  are  useful,  however,  to  derive  information  about  preferences.  We 
illustrate our approach with panel data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS) for the period 1995-2003 and we compare the results for equivalent incomes with the 
results for sub jective satisfaction. 
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responsibility is assumed by the authors.  ￿For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost
the same e⁄ect on us with enjoyment, and that we are
no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of
satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes.￿
D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature
1 Introduction
Happiness studies are shaking the routine of welfare economics. For decades practitioners
and theorists worked within a relative consensus about the view that interpersonal com-
parisons of utility were deeply problematic. This consensus involved two di⁄erent ideas,
most of the specialists endorsing at least one of them. First, advocates of the ordinal ap-
proach (such as Robbins and Samuelson) stated that interpersonal comparisons of utility
had no sound empirical basis. Second, even if interpersonal comparisons of utility could
be made, the ￿welfarist￿doctrine that considers subjective utility to be the proper metric
for the evaluation of the distribution of social advantages was rejected on ethical grounds.
The success of happiness studies has toppled the consensus on the ￿rst idea. With
the mass of data accumulated on happiness and satisfaction and the development of their
econometric exploitation, subjective utility seems more measurable than ever. There now
seem to be good reasons to trust the existence of su¢ cient regularity in human psychology,
so that interpersonal comparisons appear feasible in principle. These new developments
have triggered a revival of welfarism as well. If utility can be measured after all, why not
take it as the metric of social welfare? Several authors have taken this line (Kahneman
et al. 2004b, Layard 2005). However, none of the recent developments in the ￿eld of
measurement directly undermine the arguments that were raised against welfarism in the
philosophical debates of the previous decades. The fact that something becomes easier to
2measure does not give any new normative reason to rely on it.
Our aim in this paper is to assess whether, and how, the development of happiness
studies can be helpful for making progress in welfare economics. In a nutshell, our thesis
will be that happiness or satisfaction data can help us obtain information on individual
preferences about the various dimensions of life, in particular the dimensions which are
not directly connected to economic activity. But we will oppose the welfarist use of such
data on the ground that this is unlikely to respect individual preferences on what makes a
good life. We will introduce the concept of ￿equivalent income￿as a measure of individual
well-being that does respect individual preferences and show how the satisfaction data
can be used to implement this concept.
This paper belongs to a stream of critical literature which interrogates the implica-
tions of happiness studies for welfare economics, and includes Barrotta (2008), Burchardt
(2006), Frey and Stutzer (2007), Nussbaum (2007), Schokkaert (2007). Our work has
much in common with these papers, but our line of argument is more formal and, we
hope, more precise in the positive part of the proposal.1 Another related branch of the
literature derives estimates of willingness-to-pay from happiness surveys (Clark and Os-
wald 2002, Frey et al. 2004, L￿chinger and Raschky 2008, Van Praag and Baarsma 2005,
Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2007). Our work is similar as it seeks to estimate ordinal
preferences but we propose a di⁄erent use of such estimates.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic concepts and
the formal framework of our analysis, focusing on the distinction between preferences
and satisfaction. Section 3 derives the core argument against welfarism from axioms
1Our general discussion also addresses the speci￿c worries that have been voiced by some researchers
looking at the empirical data on happiness. We give two examples. Ravallion and Lokshin (2001) show
that satisfaction with life is strongly in￿ uenced by personality traits and then make the point that ￿the fact
that a person is inhibited, rebellious or uncon￿dent would not normally constitute a case for favourable
tax treatment￿(p. 339). Deaton (2008) observes that HIV prevalence has little e⁄ect on Africans￿life
satisfaction and suggests that satisfaction measures seem not to take up crucial dimensions of life.
3expressing the requirement to respect individual preferences over the dimensions of life.
It also introduces our own alternative approach in terms of equivalent incomes. Section
4 examines how to make use of happiness and satisfaction surveys in order to derive
relevant information about individual preferences. Section 5 illustrates our methodology
with individual panel data for Russia in the period 1995-2003. Section 6 concludes.
2 Satisfaction and preferences
The arguments put forward by Sen (1985) were very in￿ uential in spreading the criticism
of welfarism among economists. He ￿rst raised the issue of ￿physical-condition neglect￿ :
utility is only grounded on the mental attitude of the person, and does not su¢ ciently
take into account her real physical condition. Two examples are particularly illustrative.
One is the case of expensive tastes, in which a higher level of aspiration may dampen an
individual￿ s satisfaction although this hardly seems a su¢ cient reason to consider him to
be really worse-o⁄. The other is the case of persons who adapt their aspirations to their
objective circumstances: ￿A person who is ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and ill can
still be high up in the scale of happiness or desire-ful￿lment if he or she has learned to
have ￿ realistic￿desires and to take pleasure in small mercies￿(Sen, 1985, p. 21). In such
examples aspirations appear to play too big a role in the reported satisfaction while the
real conditions of life are insu¢ ciently recorded. A second important problem identi￿ed
by Sen is what he called ￿valuation neglect￿ . Valuing a life is a re￿ ective activity in a way
that ￿being happy￿or ￿desiring￿need not be (Sen, 1985, p. 29). An acceptable approach
to well-being should explicitly take into account this valuational activity by the persons
themselves.
While these criticisms of welfarism stand as convincing as ever, non-welfarist ap-
proaches have their own problems when it comes to deriving concrete proposals. They
4usually start from a list of ￿functionings￿(Sen 1985) that describes individual life in some
a priori relevant dimensions. However, to arrive at an overall measure of well-being, it is
necessary to compute a synthetic index in which these various items are weighted. It is
usually considered that this so-called ￿index problem￿raises a dilemma in which one has
to choose between welfarism and paternalism. Welfarists argue that individuals￿views of
their own life are re￿ ected in their satisfaction level. Any alternative set of weights would
not re￿ ect individuals￿views on their own life and could therefore be accused of paternal-
ism or perfectionism, of ￿playing God￿and imposing an external de￿nition of the good
life.2 In fact, the main factors shown in the happiness studies to matter tend to be quite
similar to the main items in the objective lists proposed in the non-welfarist literature.
Happiness studies stress the importance of status and social relations, the harm done by
unemployment or by competitive struggles among individuals, the bene￿ts brought by
good health and family ties, and so on. Individual autonomy appears to be a key aspect
of satisfaction with one￿ s life, which includes but is much broader than access to material
resources.
We side with those who consider that one must rely on individual preferences in order
to weight the various dimensions of life. It would certainly be utterly absurd to evaluate
individual situations without any connection to human needs and goals as perceived by
the individuals themselves. However, we ￿rmly reject the conclusion that this necessarily
leads to welfarism. Quite the contrary, the central message of this paper will be that
respecting individual preferences requires abandoning welfarism. This means in particular
that there is a way out of the dilemma between paternalism and welfarism. In this section,
we describe the intuitive core of our argument, that will be elaborated more formally in
2Layard (2005) rebuts the adaptation critique by arguing that the alternative is ominous: ￿If we
accept the Marxist idea of ￿ false consciousness￿ , we play God and decide what is good for others, even if
they will never feel it to be so.￿(p. 121)
5section 3.
The delicate part of our argument is to explain that the level of satisfaction and the
preference ranking can fall apart. Due to the in￿ uence of utilitarianism, economists are
naturally attracted to the idea that there is a unique core object that underlies answers
to happiness and satisfaction questionnaires and that represents individual preferences
￿ and they call it ￿utility￿ . But this is not how psychology sees it.3 As is emphasized,
e.g., in Diener (1994) and Diener et al. (1999), utility, if there is such a thing, is an
irreducibly multidimensional phenomenon. In particular, there is an essential distinction
between a⁄ects and cognition. In the cognitive part of their satisfaction, individuals cast
a judgment over their life. This judgment is an active exercise that is made whenever they
want to make an assessment of their situation (for instance, when a happiness surveyor
asks them to do so). It is not a quantity that stands in their brain permanently. In
contrast, positive and negative a⁄ects ￿ ow constantly when individuals are awake. Among
them are feelings of pleasure, joy, excitement, pain, sorrow, abatement, love, hate, pride,
shame, and so on, most of these items being subdivided into ￿ner categories.
In order to analyze the relationship between a⁄ects, cognitions and preferences, a
model can be helpful. Let fi denote the vector of functionings describing the life of
individual i.4 As we will see, it is best to think of fi as including the a⁄ects and feelings
that characterize the individual￿ s subjective states in his life. In contrast, the evaluative
judgment that he may cast on his life is not part of fi ￿ although this judgment may
generate a⁄ects which are part of fi: In this respect, we assume that each individual i has
an ordering over the vectors of functionings, which re￿ ects his informed judgment about
3J.S. Mill already criticized Bentham￿ s unitary concept of utility, blaming ￿the empiricism of one who
has had little experience￿(quoted in Nussbaum 2008).
4The term ￿functionings￿is convenient because, in Sen￿ s words, it includes all ￿doings and beings￿that
may ￿ll a life. But terminology is not essential, what is important is that the vector fi includes all personal
aspects of life that may matter to the individual. It may also include ￿capabilities￿(opportunities), not
just achieved functionings.
6what makes a life good or bad. We call it the ￿valuation ordering￿ , and denote it by
Ri: The expression fiRif0
i means that i weakly prefers the life described by fi to the life
described by f0
i: Let fiPif0
i denote strict preference.
To prefer a life to another is not the same thing as having a greater ￿hedonic score￿ ,
i.e., a better balance of positive and negative a⁄ects. It appears rather implausible that
individuals would care only about their hedonic subjective states. Moreover, they may
have complex views about the relative importance of various a⁄ects. Therefore, a⁄ects
are best seen as subdimensions of life vectors fi:5 In order to see the role of judgment
in the evaluation of a⁄ects, observe that while positive and negative a⁄ects can be easily
distinguished, it is not always the case that positive a⁄ects are welcome and negative
a⁄ects are shunned. There are disliked sources of pleasure; there are also certain sorts of
grief that testify to the value of what is lost, certain fears that distinguish courage from
recklessness.6 A⁄ects themselves are generally in￿ uenced by and mixed with judgments
(see Kahneman, 1999), but they do not comprehend the global evaluation an individual
makes of all the dimensions of life. The literature often recalls the Benthamite argument
that happiness is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable because all other valuable
things derive their value from their contribution to happiness.7 This argument is a sort of
tautology if happiness is understood as the evaluation of one￿ s life ￿ obviously, a thing
is valuable only insofar as it contributes to a good evaluation ￿ but it is unacceptable if
happiness is understood as a hedonic state.
Nor is to prefer a life to another the same thing as being more satis￿ed in that life,
because the satisfaction judgment is not just an ordering of various lives. It also involves
the evaluation of one￿ s life with respect to a frame of reference, in particular certain
5This view is eloquently defended in Loewenstein and Ubel (2008). Becker and Rayo (2008) also
propose to model happiness as one argument among others of individual ￿utility￿ .
6This point is made in Nussbaum (2008).
7This argument is taken up recently in Layard (2005). Diener (1994) attributes it to Aristotle. See,
however, Nussbaum (2008) on Aristotle￿ s conception of happiness.
7aspirations. Let Ai denote the vector of variables which determine i￿ s frame of reference.
From the happiness literature one knows that such variables include in particular the past
history of i￿ s life and the situation of his group of reference.8 The satisfaction level of
individual i; denoted ￿i; can then be described as determined by a function
￿i = ￿(fi;Ri;Ai): (1)
For instance, a simple possibility is when satisfaction depends on the comparison between
a level of achievement and a level of aspiration. But many other possibilities are allowed
by this model. Moreover, it is not necessary to assume at this stage that satisfaction can
be measured in a cardinal way.
Finally, there is the answer to a question such as ￿Taking all things together, how
satis￿ed are you with your life as a whole these days? Are you very satis￿ed, satis￿ed, not
very satis￿ed, not at all satis￿ed?￿ . We cannot expect individuals to give an answer that
is exactly faithful to their true ￿i: Therefore, one can only write the expressed satisfaction,
Si; as determined by a function in which a disturbance term di appears:
Si = S(￿i;di): (2)
Disturbance comes from the fact that individuals are not given enough time to re￿ ect
properly and the fact that their judgment can be tinted by the mood of the day, by the
good looks of the surveyor or by their feeling a duty to give a rosy (or a not too rosy)
answer.9
8See, e.g., Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007), Clark and Oswald (2002), Clark et al. (2008).
9Another popular question is: ￿How happy are you at the moment, all things considered?￿ , with
many di⁄erent variants. In our perspective the focus on ￿happiness￿may make answers provide more
information about a⁄ects than about the cognitive aspect of satisfaction. The fact that happiness and
satisfaction questionnaires usually give similar statistical results in the literature suggests that both su⁄er
from an insu¢ cient clari￿cation of the object of the question, leading respondents to give a confused
8The essential distinction between ￿preferences￿and ￿satisfaction￿ , as re￿ ected in (1)
and (2) comes out clearly in the empirical literature. Consider the famous discrepancy
between the evolution of satisfaction over time, which is rather stable for most countries
in the long run, and the growth of GDP. It is usually interpreted as meaning that income
growth, at the national level, does not really improve satisfaction in the long run.10 Yet
it sounds exaggerate to derive from this the claim that people do not really care about
material resources. Consider the following thought experiment. Propose to people in the
1960s to double their real income and to have access to mobile phones, internet, low-cost
air transport and the rest, in combination with an increase in life expectancy of about
ten years. Make sure they understand that it is not their relative standing that will rise
but the whole society. Would they not see this perspective as particularly attractive?
Symmetrically, ask people living in the 2000s to imagine all of them going back to the
standard of living of the 1960s, with the corresponding reduced life expectancy. Would
they consider it a minor sacri￿ce? The most plausible conjecture is that the former would
heartily accept the change while the latter would strongly resist it. One interpretation of
such attitudes is that people are mistaken about what really matters to them, about what
really a⁄ects their satisfaction. We believe that there is some truth in this interpretation,
but that it is not the whole story, nor even its main part. Even when one forecasts that,
by adapting one￿ s aspirations, one￿ s satisfaction will remain stable in the long run, one
can still have de￿nite preferences for a longer and more a› uent life. Such preferences are
not proved to be mistaken when one comes to adapt to one￿ s current conditions and to
consider them as the frame of reference when answering satisfaction questionnaires.11
answer mixing a⁄ects or cognitive evaluation, possibly in di⁄erent proportions for di⁄erent respondents.
10See Easterlin (1995), Oswald (1997). While this is a long-standing ￿nding in the happiness literature,
it is still matter of debate. See in particular Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) and, in the same issue, the
comments by G. Becker and L. Rayo and by A. Krueger.
11Another possible interpretation of the stability of satisfaction curves in the long run is that while
some aspects have improved (income, life expectancy), others have worsened (social relations, economic
risk). If that were the case, then people should declare indi⁄erence to our hypothetical questions if the
9Here is another example in the same vein. Schkade and Kahneman (1998) have found
that in the USA, students living in California and students living in the Midwest have
similar levels of satisfaction with their lives, although both declare that someone like them
would have a better life in California than in the Midwest. The most likely explanation
for this ￿nding is again that all these students do prefer to be in California, other things
equal, while once they are completely settled in one region this preference does not appear
in their satisfaction levels because they adapt their standards to their current situation,
in what Kahneman has called an ￿aspiration treadmill￿ .12
Given that it is possible and necessary to distinguish preferences, satisfaction and
a⁄ects, here comes our main argument: the measure of well-being to be used in welfare
economics should respect preferences Ri; and should therefore not be based on the sat-
isfaction level ￿i nor on the ￿happiness￿a⁄ects featuring in fi: We consider it essential
to respect ￿individual sovereignty￿￿ a term that we prefer over the more traditional
but more restricted notion of ￿consumer sovereignty￿ . First, we strongly feel that the
well-being of individuals should be evaluated on the basis of their (cognitive) view on
what is a good life, rather than solely in terms of a⁄ects.13 Second, as far as satisfaction
way of life of the two epochs were described in a su¢ ciently complete way. We doubt that this would be
their answer.
12Schkade and Kahneman (1998) suggested that the answers could be the result of a ￿focusing illusion￿ ,
namely, considering the di⁄erence between the two regions makes them think about the climate and
overestimate the importance of the weather for their overall satisfaction. Kahneman (2008) explains how
he later hypothesized that the ￿aspiration treadmill￿was a better explanation of the California-Midwest
study. He combined it with the hypothesis that people are really happier in California but have higher
standards of happiness when declaring their satisfaction. He explains he no longer believes in this joint
hypothesis because more recent studies have shown that happiness is more adaptable than satisfaction,
i.e., the ￿hedonic treadmill￿is stronger than the ￿aspiration treadmill￿ . It seems to us, however, that these
later results do not disprove the existence of an aspiration treadmill. They just suggest that Californians
are neither happier nor more satis￿ed than others. Our main point is that all this is compatible with
everyone having a de￿nite preference for being in California.
13An important part of the happiness literature (Kahneman 1999, Kahneman et al. 1997, 2004a,b)
has made the interesting point that hedonic states form an ￿objective￿ sort of happiness that is not
well understood and memorized by the individuals themselves. As a consequence, speci￿c methods are
needed to measure it. This literature initially endorsed the Benthamite view that the aggregate quantity
of objective happiness should be maximized, in spite of the paradox that this is not what people recall
and care about (this objection is raised in Hausman 2007). Kahneman and Krueger (2006) have quali￿ed
10judgments are concerned, it appears that people do not seek merely to ￿be satis￿ed￿
by all possible means. According to our model one can ￿be satis￿ed￿by three means:
1) by achieving one￿ s goals (fi); 2) by reducing one￿ s aspirations (Ai); 3) by adapting
one￿ s preferences (Ri).14 If we want to respect individual sovereignty, we should focus
only on the degree of achievement of people￿ s goals. Satisfaction levels are not a reli-
able proxy for it. In fact, with our simple model, it is easy to understand why one￿ s
satisfaction level is not necessarily in line with one￿ s judgment over one￿ s life. It is in-
deed possible to have ￿(fi;Ri;Ai) ￿ ￿(f0
i;Ri;A0
i) even though fiPif0
i: This can happen
if the adaptation of aspirations overshoots, for instance because the reference group un-
dergoes a better improvement than i. Or, if a rich life f￿￿ is preferred to a poor life f￿
by two individuals i and j having the same views about life, Ri = Rj; it can happen
that ￿(f￿￿;Ri;Ai) = ￿(f￿;Rj;Aj) when the rich ￿su⁄ers￿from high aspirations whereas
the poor has adapted his aspirations to his situation. To conclude that the two lives are
equally good because ￿i = ￿j; however, would go against these individuals￿own unani-
mous judgments. Therefore, rather than a way to avoid paternalism, welfarism is deeply
paternalistic itself.15
We do not claim that the individual valuation orderings are always respectable. Indi-
viduals may su⁄er from imperfect information, irrationality, or be conditioned by question-
able social customs. An important literature has been emphasizing behavioral anomalies
and some authors consider that the mere concept of preferences is problematic in this
this view, noting that the happiness data are not so reliable, especially for interpersonal comparisons,
because of strong adaptation e⁄ects and substantial cultural variations. As a consequence they propose
a di⁄erent index that measures the amount of time that individuals spend in negative mood. This index
is less sensitive to scaling errors than average happiness. Diener (2000) also notes that time spent in
positive or negative mood is a better predictor of people￿ s own recording of happiness.
14Barry (2007) compares an individual who would seek to be satis￿ed per se ￿ instead of getting what
he wants ￿ to a football fan who would support whatever team is most likely to win. What kind of
football fan would that be?
15Another tradition, coming from Buddhism and Stoicism, downplays the achievement of one￿ s goals
and puts the adaptation of preferences and aspirations to the centre stage. This appears to be motivated
by the objective of reducing negative a⁄ects like anguish and frustration. See, e.g., Kolm (1982).
11light.16 This is why we have been careful to make the principle of individual sovereignty
conditional on the assumption that the valuation orderings are respectable. We only
claim that if there is no reason to attribute ￿ aws to these orderings, they should be re-
spected. If there are convincing reasons to think that preferences are ￿ awed, they should
be ￿laundered￿ 17 before being used for the evaluation of social states. How and when
to launder preferences is a di¢ cult question, but using subjective satisfaction measures
as the ultimate criterion is de￿nitely not an attractive option. More generally, a careful
examination of how the lessons from behavioral economics should be taken into account
in our approach will await future research. Bernheim (2008) argues that some parts of
individual preferences are not subject to reversals and can serve as partial orderings from
which welfare conclusions can be drawn.18 We will assume complete individual orderings
in this paper but our approach can be extended to incomplete orderings. The details of
such extension will be examined in future work.
In the rest of the paper we examine two questions. First, while we have rejected
welfarism as an attractive solution to the index problem, we still have to explore more
formally the implications of individual sovereignty for de￿ning a proper way of making
interpersonal comparisons. This will be done in the following section. In the next sections
we explore how to retrieve valuable information about Ri from the happiness surveys.
3 From individual sovereignty to equivalence
When performing interpersonal comparisons, one does not just have to compare function-
ing vectors fi across individuals, but also to take account of the concerned individuals￿
16See, e.g., Kahneman and Thaler (2006), Dolan and Kahneman (2008).
17The expression comes from Goodin (1986).
18We cannot agree with his suggestion to rely on choices in order to elicit such unambiguous preferences,
because there are many aspects of quality of life that are not chosen by individuals. Hopefully, statements
of satisfaction or preferences can be relied upon for such non-chosen elements of quality of life.
12preferences. So, really, one has to compare 4-tuples (fi;Ri;Ai;di): In this section we set
aside the informational problem that Ri may be imperfect or imperfectly observed, in or-
der to de￿ne an ideal method of comparisons that may guide us in applications involving
imperfections.
Our guiding principle is individual sovereignty: when ￿ as assumed in this section
￿ there is no reason to correct Ri for any ￿ aw, we should respect it. We will ￿rst show
that the welfarist ranking that simply compares utilities or satisfaction levels ￿i or Si
across individuals does not respect even a very weak version of the principle of individual
sovereignty. We will then show how a natural interpretation of the principle leads to the
so-called equivalence ordering.
To ￿x ideas, we assume that there are m dimensions of life and that fi can take any
value in Rm
+: We also assume that Ri is continuous and that it is weakly monotonic, i.e.,
that fi ￿ f0
i implies fiRif0
i and fi ￿ f0
i implies fiPif0
i.
The most important and most immediate application of the principle of individual
sovereignty is to respect Ri over comparisons concerning only i; i.e.,
(fi;Ri;Ai;di) is at least as good as (f0
i;Ri;Ai;di) if and only if fiRif0
i:
Let us call it the ￿Personal-Preference Principle￿ . We can extend this principle
to comparisons between individuals having identical preferences. That is,
if Ri = Rj; then (fi;Ri;Ai;di) is at least as good as (fj;Rj;Aj;dj) if and only if fiRifj:
We will call this the ￿Same-Preference Principle￿ . The Same-Preference Princi-
ple logically implies the Personal-Preference Principle (as a special case). The Same-
Preference Principle is not familiar in welfare economics, contrary to the Personal-
Preference Principle. But, as we argued in the previous sections, when two individuals
make identical evaluations of all possible lives, it seems problematic to go against their
13common view about their own lives. Another compelling application of the principle is to
changes over time for the same individual. In that setting the ￿same-preference principle￿
states that, if preferences over time remain the same, they should be respected, even if
the individual adapts to the situation and changes his aspiration level.
The Same-Preference Principle implies that the evaluation of (f;R;A;d) must not
depend on A;d at all. Consequently, it is clear that the welfarist ranking respects the
Personal-Preference Principle but does not respect the Same-Preference Principle. This
was precisely the point of the 1960-2000 and California-Midwest examples introduced
before. Since the Same-Preference Principle is compelling if one wants to respect in-
dividual sovereignty, this appears to exclude welfarism as an approach to interpersonal
comparisons. Discarding welfarism, however, brings us back to the ￿index problem￿ . Is it
possible to avoid paternalism, i.e. to extend the application of the principle of individual
sovereignty for a world in which di⁄erent individuals may have di⁄erent preferences?
Let us start from what seems an obvious idea, which is in line with the examples given
before. Why not extend the Same-Preference Principle to situations in which Ri 6= Rj?
This would read as follows:
(fi;Ri;Ai;di) is at least as good as (fj;Rj;Aj;dj) if fiRifj and fiRjfj;
and strictly better if fiPifj and fiPjfj:
Although this may sound like a natural extension, it is impossible to satisfy. Con-
sider the following example. Take fi;fj;fk 2 Rm
+ yielding the con￿guration of indif-
ference curves displayed in Figure 1. By this extended principle, (fi;Ri;Ai;di) is bet-
ter than (fk;Rk;Ak;dk), which is itself better than (fj;Rj;Aj;dj); which is better than
(fi;Ri;Ai;di) : we have a cycle. Extending the application of the principle of individual












Figure 1: Impossibility of the extended Same-Preference Principle
To make progress, one must add restrictions to the premiss of the requirement in
order to make it reasonable. We will consider two possible approaches. A ￿rst possible
restriction consists in requiring the individuals to agree on other vectors than just fi;fj:
In particular, one could propose that:
(fi;Ri;Ai;di) is at least as good as (resp., strictly better than) (fj;Rj;Ai;di)
if the indi⁄erence set for Ri that contains fi lies nowhere below (resp., everywhere above)
the indi⁄erence set for Rj that contains fj:
Let us call this the ￿Indi⁄erence Set Dominance Principle￿ . This principle
logically implies the Same-Preference Principle and seems to be yet another sensible em-
anation of individual sovereignty.
A second possible restriction consists in requiring to have fiRfj (or fiPfj) for all
admissible preference orderings R (not just for Ri and Rj), which in our case is equivalent
to requiring fi ￿ fj (or fi ￿ fj). This gives us the following ￿Vector Dominance
Principle￿ :19
(fi;Ri;Ai;di) is at least as good as (fj;Rj;Aj;dj) if fi ￿ fj;
19This axiom corresponds to Sen￿ s (1985) ￿intersection principle￿ . On this issue, see in particular Brun
and Tungodden (2004).
15and strictly better if fi ￿ fj:
While this principle seems very reasonable at ￿rst sight, it is incompatible with
the Personal-Preference Principle, which we introduced as the most essential feature of
individual sovereignty. Indeed, it implies that (f;R;A;d) is as good as (f;R0;A0;d0) for
all f and all R;R0;A;A0;d;d0; so that R plays no role in the evaluation of (f;R;A;d);
contrary to what is required by the Personal-Preference Principle.
Even the requirement that (fi;Ri;Ai;di) be better than (fj;Rj;Aj;dj) whenever fi ￿
fj is incompatible with the Personal-Preference Principle. This incompatibility is shown
by the following example. Take fi;fj;f0
i;f0
j 2 Rm





j. Figure 2 illustrates this con￿guration in a two-dimensional case.
The Personal-Preference Principle implies that (f0
i;Ri;Ai;di) is better than (fi;Ri;Ai;di)
and (fj;Rj;Aj;dj) is better than (f0
j;Rj;Aj;dj) while the Vector Dominance Principle
implies that (fi;Ri;Ai;di) is better than (fj;Rj;Aj;dj) and (f0
j;Rj;Aj;dj) is better than
(f0















Figure 2: Incompatibility between the Vector Dominance and the Personal-Preference
Principles
In virtue of individual sovereignty, we believe that the Personal-Preference Principle
must be given priority. We therefore cannot retain the Vector Dominance Principle. We
16can nonetheless seek a weakening of the Vector Dominance Principle that is compatible
with some respect for preferences. A rather natural solution consists in restricting the
application of the dominance idea to a certain region of the space of functioning vectors.
The restriction to a region of the space makes a lot of sense in concrete applications.
Consider for instance a simple world with only two functionings, health and wealth.
Imagine two individuals such that one has slightly more wealth than the other, but both
have a poor health. It is not obvious that the wealthier individual is better-o⁄ than the
other when it happens that he cares more about health and would be willing to make
a great sacri￿ce of wealth if this could alleviate his health problems. In contrast, when
individuals are healthy it appears natural to rank them according to their wealth. This
amounts to restricting the application of the Dominance Principle to the region of the
space where individuals are healthy. We will see other applications in the next sections.
Requiring interpersonal comparisons to satisfy the Personal-Preference Principle in
conjunction with the Vector Dominance Principle restricted to a region has strong con-
sequences because it basically imposes a speci￿c approach to interpersonal comparisons,
namely, the equivalence approach. The equivalence approach consists in specifying a
monotone path in the space of functioning vectors Rm
+, and comparing (fi;Ri;Ai;di) and
(fj;Rj;Aj;dj) by the relative positions of the vectors f￿
i and f￿
j from the monotone path
such that fiIif￿
i and fjIjf￿
j . This is illustrated in Figure 3a, where (fi;Ri;Ai;di) is de-
clared inferior to (fj;Rj;Aj;dj) in this fashion, with the monotone path given by the
dotted line.
Proposition 1 Let B be a subset of Rm
+ such that for every (fi;Ri) there is f￿
i in B
such that fiIif￿
i : The Vector Dominance Principle restricted to B; in conjunction with the
Personal-Preference Principle, implies the equivalence approach (with B as the monotone
path), and also implies the Indi⁄erence Set Dominance Principle (as well as the Same-
17Preference Principle).
A complete proof of this result is provided in the appendix. The core argument is
the following. Suppose that the region B over which the Vector Dominance Principle
applies is large enough to potentially contain a con￿guration as in Figure 2. One would
then obtain a contradiction. This fact implies that the region over which the Vector
Dominance Principle applies must be as thin as a curve. Moreover, one shows that this
curve must be increasing in Rm
+; de￿ning a monotone path that, by the Personal-Preference
Principle, serves as in the equivalence approach.
This result suggests that the equivalence approach strikes a good compromise between
the ideal of respecting the diversity of preferences, as embodied in the Personal-Preference,
Same-Preference and Indi⁄erence Set Dominance Principles, and the vector dominance
idea. It is particularly satisfactory that the stronger Indi⁄erence Set Dominance Principle
follows from the combination of the Personal-Preference Principle with a vector dominance
requirement.
Although an equivalence ordering is a rather speci￿c approach to interpersonal com-
parisons ￿ in particular, it is not welfarist ￿ the class of equivalence orderings is large.
It consists in all orderings which compare tuples (f;R;A;d) exclusively in terms of the
corresponding indi⁄erence sets, and evaluate any given indi⁄erence set by the point of the
monotone path that it contains. A prominent example in this class is famous in economic
theory, namely, the ray utility function, which takes a reference f0 and computes utility as
the real number ￿ such that the individual is indi⁄erent between f and ￿f0: This function
can be found in many references, e.g., Debreu (1959), Samuelson (1977), Pazner (1979).20
20One can extend the class of equivalence orderings and replace the monotone path by a collection of
nested sets. An example is the money-metric utility function, which takes a reference price vector p0 and
computes ￿ such that the maximum satisfaction attainable with an expenditure equal to ￿ under the
price p0 is equal to the satisfaction reached with f: This function can be found, e.g., in Samuelson (1974).
Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) have criticized the money-metric utility function for failing to yield
quasi-concave social orderings over allocations, and their criticism can be extended to apply to the ray
18Given the great variety of equivalence orderings, one must ask how to go about the
choice of the monotone path. We do not have a complete theory for this, but the literature
o⁄ers examples where some foundations for a special choice of path can be obtained by
specifying distributional judgments that are independent of individual preferences. We
introduced already the health-wealth case. As another example, in Maniquet and Spru-
mont (2004), studying a public good economy with money, a particular path is deduced
from the axiom that it is a social improvement to reduce the inequality in money transfers
between any agent who contributes and any agent who is subsidized. All recent character-
izations of social orderings based on equivalence rankings involve conditions of this sort,



















Figure 3: Illustration of the equivalence approach
In the next section, we provide a simple example of how a particular monotone path
can be chosen. This is an extension of the health case and is closely related to money-
metric utilities proposed by Samuelson (1974) and, for welfare analysis, by Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980) and King (1983). In this approach one picks reference values for the
various functionings (except income). These reference values are chosen in such a way
utility function and similar constructs. The problem, however, disappears when the social aggregation
relies on the maximin or leximin criterion, and is substantially alleviated when inequality aversion is put
in the social aggregation. For a recent discussion of the pros and cons of the equivalence approach, see
Fleurbaey (2008).
19that it seems ethically acceptable to compare the well-being of the individuals in terms of
their income, independently of their preferences, when they are at these reference values.
The equivalence idea then implies that one looks for what we will call an equivalent
income Y ￿
i for each individual i. This equivalent income is such that the individual
is indi⁄erent between her actual functionings bundle (including her actual income Yi)
and the bundle containing Y ￿
i and all the other functionings at their reference levels.
Interpersonal comparisons can then be relevantly made with these values Y ￿
i . This is
illustrated in Figure 3b.
4 Estimating equivalent incomes with happiness
data: some methodological issues
In this section we study if, and how, the theoretical proposal from the previous section can
be implemented using data from a satisfaction survey. This requires retrieving information
about Ri from data about Si: The typical ￿satisfaction with life￿question is formulated
in the following way: ￿To what extent are you satis￿ed with your life in general at the
present time?￿ , with answers on a discrete scale ranging from ￿fully satis￿ed￿to ￿not at
all satis￿ed￿ . In many publications, the responses to this question are then explained by
an (often linear) regression:
Sit = ￿
0Xit + dit: (3)
with Sit the satisfaction with life of individual i in period t, Xit a vector of explanatory
variables, dit a disturbance term and ￿ a vector of coe¢ cients to be estimated. The vector
Xit usually contains a diverse set of variables, some of which describe the conditions of life
of individual i (typical examples are income or expenditures, health, quality of housing,
marital status), while others capture personal characteristics (such as gender, ethnicity or
20being religious). In addition to measurement errors and to the e⁄ects of omitted variables,
the disturbance term dit is also meant to capture the mood of the day of the respondent
and the e⁄ects of short-run random events.
Two econometric issues that have been extensively discussed in the literature, are
especially relevant within our theoretical framework (see, e.g. the discussion in Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). First, there is a serious concern that unobserved personal
characteristics might lead to biased estimates of the parameters of interest ￿. In fact, the
psychological literature has pointed to the crucial importance of personality traits such as
extroversion, conscientiousness and emotional stability for the explanation of satisfaction.
It is likely that these personality traits are correlated with some of the variables in Xit.
Not taking into account this unobserved individual heterogeneity will then lead to biased
estimates of ￿. It is therefore now generally accepted that it is preferable to work with
panel data and to include individual ￿xed e⁄ects in (3). We can make this explicit by
rewriting (3) as (with some abuse of notation)
Sit = ￿i + ￿t + ￿
0Xit + dit ; (4)
where individual ￿xed e⁄ects and time e⁄ects are represented by ￿i and ￿t respectively.
Second, given the discrete nature of the response categories, the natural econometric
model to estimate (3) or (4) is an ordered logit or probit model. This has indeed become
the dominant approach by economists, who are aware of the ordinal nature of the satis-
faction measure and of the problem of interpersonal comparability. We will return to the
latter problem at the end of this section. Let us for the moment accept that one wants to
estimate an ordered logit model. Estimating (4) then raises the non-trivial econometric
issue of how to incorporate individual ￿xed e⁄ects in an ordered logit model. As discussed
by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) and Frijters et al. (2006), it has been quite common in the
21satisfaction literature either to return to a cardinal speci￿cation and estimate a linear ￿xed
e⁄ects model or to collapse the satisfaction score into a binary outcome and to apply the
Chamberlain (1980) approach. The ￿rst approach is unattractive from a theoretical point
of view21, the second approach induces a huge loss of information, since only the indi-
viduals that pass the single threshold are taken up in the estimations. Ferrer-i-Carbonell
and Frijters (2004) therefore propose an extension of the Chamberlain-approach, in which
the single threshold is no longer ￿xed but is made individual-speci￿c. This ￿conditional
￿xed-e⁄ect ordered logit model￿has been applied by Frijters et al. (2004) and Frijters et
al. (2006) to German and Russian satisfaction data. While this extension makes it possi-
ble to make a more e¢ cient use of the available information, it is computationally rather
complicated. It turns out, however, that a good approximation of the original method is
obtained by using the within-individual mean satisfaction score as the threshold.22
Let us leave the econometric issues aside and return to our interpretation of the
model. A comparison of (4) with (1) and (2) from Section 3 shows that the vector of
explanatory variables Xit contains indicators of fit (the dimensions of life or the func-
tionings of individual i) as well as variables measuring personal characteristics of i, that
are related to her individual frame of reference Ait and her individual preferences Rit.
Remember that we have assumed that Sit is a correct numerical representation of the
preference ordering Rit: we therefore take it for granted that Sit > S0
it if and only if
fitRitf0
it.23 In our approach, di⁄erences in the frame of reference (the aspiration levels)
should not play a role in the overall evaluation of the living standard, while di⁄erences in
21It should be mentioned, however, that the results for the cardinal model are usually very similar to
the results for the ordered logit (or probit) speci￿cations - see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004).
22This simpli￿cation can be implemented easily in STATA. Jones and Schurer (2007) report that with
their data the results for the full approach and for the simpli￿ed approach are very similar. In fact, in
their paper they propose a further generalization of the Ferrer and Frijters-method. This generalisation
is not attractive for our purposes, however, because it would not allow us to identify all parameters of
interest. We thank Andrew Jones for sending us the STATA-code to implement the simpli￿ed conditional
￿xed e⁄ects ordered logit model.
23We assume implicitly that ￿xing t also ￿xes Ait and dit.
22preferences should be respected. Therefore, to proceed we have to think explicitly about
the interpretation of the di⁄erent variables in the vector Xit. Moreover, in our interpreta-
tion it is hardly acceptable to work with a simple linear speci￿cation of (4). Indeed, since
the vector of achieved functionings fit is part of Xit, such a linear form would imply that
all individuals have identical preferences, and that these preferences are characterized by
perfect substitutability between the functionings fit. These unrealistic assumptions would
make the application of our approach trivial. At the same time, with the available data,
it is not feasible to estimate a highly nonlinear speci￿cation of the satisfaction equation
which at the same time allows for preference variation. We therefore propose the following
compromise speci￿cation:
Sit = ￿i + ￿t + ￿ ln(Yit) + (# + ￿Zit)
0fit + ￿
0Zit + dit (5)
with (￿;#;￿) a vector of direct e⁄ects and ￿ a matrix with interaction e⁄ects to be
estimated. Let us explain more carefully the di⁄erent components of (5).
The initial step is the de￿nition of the vector of relevant life dimensions fit. Every-
body agrees that income (represented in (5) by Yit) is relevant. It is common to introduce
a logarithmic transformation of Yit in the satisfaction equation to capture some relevant
nonlinearities.24 With respect to the other functionings, di⁄erent ￿lists￿have been pro-
posed in the literature. However, they are to a large extent overlapping and the most
common items on these lists are part of the typical X-vector in the happiness literature:
health, quality of housing and employment are examples. We will return to the problem
24We use here the logarithmic transformation of Yit only as an example, because it turned out to be
the most adequate speci￿cation in our data. Yet the argumentation in this section does not depend on
this speci￿c choice and could easily be adapted to other nonlinear transformations of Yit. Moreover, we
agree with Oswald (2008) that the fact that the logarithmic transformation yields the best ￿t for the
observed satisfaction scores does not allow us to draw direct conclusions about the cardinalization of the
￿true￿utility function.
23of specifying the relevant functionings in the next section, when we interpret our own
empirical results for Russia. Let us now for the moment suppose that the problem is
solved and that we can de￿ne a vector fit, containing the relevant dimensions of life apart
from income.
The variables Zit then measure the other personal characteristics of the individuals
- typical examples being age and gender. These conditioning variables enter (5) in two
ways. First, the direct e⁄ects of changes in Zit are captured by the coe¢ cients ￿. These
direct e⁄ects only shift the level of satisfaction upward or downward, without changing the
marginal rates of substitution between the functionings. In our theoretical framework such
upward and downward shifts (leaving the indi⁄erence curves the same) are interpreted
as changes in aspiration levels. The individual ￿xed e⁄ects ￿i, the time variables ￿t and
the disturbance terms dit have an analogous e⁄ect. They are all interpreted as features of
the frame of reference of individual i. Note that the ￿xed e⁄ects ￿i take up all the time-
invariant individual characteristics. For instance, if individuals have preferences about
some of their ￿xed bodily characteristics, the inequalities generated by their satisfaction
about these characteristics cannot be recorded by this approach.
Second, the interaction terms between the conditioning variables Zit and the func-
tionings fit allow us to model di⁄erences and changes in preferences. More speci￿cally,
(5) implies that the vector MRS
Y f
it of marginal rates of substitution between income and







While (5) allows for preference variation, this variation is still limited, as we assume that
it is linked only to variation in the variables Zit. Individuals with the same values for
24these conditioning variables are assumed to have identical preferences.25 It is di¢ cult
to do better with the available data, which contain only one observation of individual
satisfaction at each moment of time.
Let us now apply the ideas from the previous section to derive an overall indicator
of the individual quality of life. We ￿rst choose a monotone path, which will allow us
to derive a relevant equivalence ordering. As mentioned before, the most straightforward
way to do so is to pick reference values for all the dimensions of life, except income.
Let us denote these reference values for the life dimensions by f: We can then calculate
the ￿equivalent income￿ Y ￿
it that makes individual i indi⁄erent between the bundle of
functionings (Y ￿
it;f) and his actual bundle (Yit;fit), by solving the following equation:
￿ lnY
￿
it + (# + ￿Zit)













These equivalent incomes will be our measure of the welfare position of the individuals.
Note that the conditioning variables Zit only appear in (8) in so far as they in￿ uence the
preferences ￿ the direct e⁄ects on the level of satisfaction (captured by ￿ in (5)) are
irrelevant for the welfare evaluation. The same is true for the idiosyncratic disturbance
term dit and for the ￿xed e⁄ects ￿i and the time e⁄ects ￿t, none of which appear in (7)
and (8).26
25Note that this is not the case for the aspiration levels, which are di⁄erent for di⁄erent individuals
because of the presence in eq. (5) of the individual ￿xed e⁄ects ￿i and of the idiosyncratic disturbance
term dit.
26At this stage one could wonder why not simply use the right-hand side of eq. (7) as a measure of well-
being. In fact, di⁄erences in aspiration levels will not in￿ uence these ￿corrected￿measures of satisfaction
either (see also Schokkaert, 2007). However, the use of equivalent incomes is clearly preferable for two
reasons. First, using the right-hand side of eq. (7) would not satisfy the Subset Dominance Principle.
Second, when comparing two individuals with fit = fjt = f, their relative levels of well-being would
25Our theoretical framework points to the importance of two further features of the
empirical approach. First, social interdependencies and adaptation played an essential
role in our interpretation of the satisfaction measures. To introduce these e⁄ects in the
empirical analysis, we have to interpret Zit broadly. Social interdependencies can be
approximated by introducing relevant features of the reference groups of the individuals,
e.g., average levels for the achieved functionings. The adaptation of aspiration levels can
be analyzed by exploiting the panel nature of the data and introducing past achievements
of the various functionings (Burchardt, 2005; Di Tella et al., 2007).27 Equations (5) and
(7) then illustrate the double role of social interdependencies and past achievements. If
they induce changes in the aspiration levels, this will be captured by the direct e⁄ects ￿
and will not in￿ uence the equivalent incomes. If they change preferences, i.e. marginal
rates of substitution, this will be re￿ ected in (8). Identi￿cation of these di⁄erent e⁄ects
is based on the estimation of the interaction e⁄ects in (5).
Second, we return to the issue of interpersonal comparability of the satisfaction mea-
sures. The simplest way to specify an ordered logit (or probit) model is to introduce a
set of ￿xed threshold parameters ￿j (j = 1;:::;q ￿ 1, with q the number of response cate-
gories). Interpreting Sit as a ￿latent￿satisfaction variable, the observed discrete responses
e Sit are then modelled as
e Sit = j if ￿j￿1 < Sit 6 ￿j
Substituting (5) for Sit and assuming that dit follows a logistic distribution leads to the
ordered logit model.28 Econometricians have proposed di⁄erent methods to relax the
assumption of ￿xed thresholds in this simple ordered logit model, but all these methods
require speci￿c assumptions if one wants to identify all parameters of interest. Our setting
depend on the values of Zi and Zj, in a way which seems rather arbitrary.
27We acknowledge that this implies an abuse of the notation Zit, and more speci￿cally of the subscript
it:
28Assuming that dit follows a normal distribution leads to the ordered probit model.
26with changing and variable aspiration levels suggests a natural approach to this issue,
which is to assume that the thresholds depend on those personal characteristics of the
individuals that are related to their frame of reference. We can write this as:
￿jit = ￿j + ￿i + ￿t + ￿
0Zit for j = 1;:::;q ￿ 1 (9)
with ￿i an individual ￿xed e⁄ect, ￿t a time e⁄ect and (￿j;￿) a vector of coe¢ cients
to be estimated. Equation (9) still implies that the range of the response categories
(￿jit ￿￿(j￿1)it) is ￿xed and equal to (￿j ￿￿j￿1) for all individuals and all periods of time,
but the speci￿c values of the thresholds are now individual-speci￿c and time-dependent.
Using (5) and (9), we can model the answers of the respondents as
e Sit = j if ￿j￿1 + (￿i ￿ ￿i) + (￿t ￿ ￿t) ￿ ￿ ln(Yit) ￿ (# + ￿Zit)
0fit + (￿ ￿ ￿)
0Zit < dit
6 ￿j + (￿i ￿ ￿i) + (￿t ￿ ￿t) ￿ ￿ ln(Yit) ￿ (# + ￿Zit)
0fit + (￿ ￿ ￿)
0Zit (10)
With suitable distributional assumptions on dit, we can estimate this model with ordered
logit or ordered probit.29 At ￿rst sight, adopting the more ￿ exible speci￿cation (9) comes
at a considerable cost, as it is no longer possible to identify the parameters (￿i;￿t;￿) in
the satisfaction equation (5). For our purposes, however, this does not matter, since these
parameters do not play any role in the calculation of the equivalent incomes (8). We
therefore do not need to make the strong identi￿cation assumption that the values of the
response categories are the same for all individuals and are constant over time.
29As explained in the beginning of this section, the presence of individual ￿xed e⁄ects forces us to use
only one threshold per individual for estimation purposes.
275 With the data: Russia 1995-2003
To illustrate our approach, we use the data from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (RLMS). These RLMS-data have already been used to analyse life satisfaction
in Russia by Frijters et al. (2006), Graham et al. (2004), Ravallion and Lokshin (2001,
2002), Senik (2004) and Zavisca and Hout (2005). We introduce the data and show the
results for the estimation of the satisfaction equation in the ￿rst subsection. In the second
subsection we derive and discuss the estimates of the equivalent incomes.
5.1 Life satisfaction in Russia
The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) is an extremely rich panel of nation-
ally representative surveys designed to monitor the e⁄ects of Russian reforms on the health
and economic welfare of households and individuals in the Russian Federation. These ef-
fects are measured by a variety of means: detailed monitoring of individuals￿health status
and dietary intake; precise measurement of household-level expenditures and service uti-
lization; and collection of relevant community-level data, including region-speci￿c prices
and community infrastructure data. Data have been collected thirteen times since 1992.
As it is generally thought that the data of the pre-1995 waves are less reliable, we use the
data for the seven waves of 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. After dropping
the observations with inconsistent information we keep a sample of 12016 individuals.
There is considerable sample attrition, with replenishment of the sample at each wave.
On average, the 12016 individuals appear in 3.82 waves. Of the 4227 individuals in the
wave of 1995, 2498 remain present in the sample until 2003. Since the relatively rich and
young individuals living in the urban areas are more likely to drop out of the sample, the
balanced subpanel is not representative for the population. Since, moreover, working with
this balanced subpanel would entail a considerable loss of e¢ ciency, all our estimates are
28for the full unbalanced panel.30
Russia in the period 1995-2003 was an economy in turmoil, with in 1998 a sharp
devaluation of the ruble. From an econometric point of view, this has the advantage that
there is a lot of variation in the data, with many individuals experiencing large (and often
exogenous) changes in their living standard. The general economic situation is amazingly
well re￿ ected in the average results for the question: ￿To what extent are you satis￿ed
with your life in general at the present time?￿ , with answers on a ￿ve point-scale from
￿not at all satis￿ed￿to ￿fully satis￿ed￿ . Figure 4 shows the distribution of the answers
to that question: compared to most other life satisfaction studies, a large fraction of the
Russian population was ￿less than satis￿ed￿or ￿not satis￿ed￿with their life, with an
all-time low of satisfaction in 1998, the year of the devaluation. After 1998, there is a
gradual increase in average satisfaction, in parallel with the improvement of the economic
situation.31
The RLMS contains all the information that is commonly used in the happiness
literature. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis are given in Table
1. By way of introduction, we show the estimation results for (3) and (4) in the ￿rst
two columns of Table 2 (models A and B respectively). We work at the level of the
individuals and correct the standard errors for clustering at the household level. For the
reasons explained in the previous section, all the results shown are for an ordered logit
speci￿cation.32 The results for model A, i.e. the pooled ordered logit without individual
￿xed e⁄ects, are perfectly in line with what is usually found in the literature. We prefer to
introduce the logarithm of household expenditures, rather than household income. Despite
30Frijters et al. (2006) also work with the unbalanced panel and show that attrition may bias the
estimates obtained from the balanced panel.
31Many authors working with the RLMS have pooled the answers for the top categories of satisfaction,
as the number of fully satis￿ed individuals is rather low. We did not opt for that approach, because the
number of ￿fully satis￿ed￿individuals is increasing in the later periods (that were not included in the
previous work) and shows overall a very reasonable pattern.
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Figure 4: Evolution of satisfaction over time.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003
N 4227 4879 5832 7096 7673 8262 7894
satisfaction 2.19 2.16 2.08 2.40 2.59 2.86 2.76
income (per consumption unit) 3780 3515 3037 3429 4168 4666 5187
expenditures (per consumption unit) 5278 4775 3807 4517 5009 5224 5828
self-assessed health 3.10 3.13 3.12 3.11 3.11 3.11 3.10
house (in 100.000 rubbles) 1.54 1.55 1.65 1.68 1.74 1.76 1.77
unemployment (in %) 7 8 10 8 8 8 8
arrears (in %) 26 32 53 14 12 11 10
male (in %) 41 43 43 44 43 43 43
minority (in %) 15 15 14 14 14 14 14
rural (in %) 28 27 27 28 26 27 27
higher education (in %) 70 68 68 68 72 75 76
age (in 2000) 50 48 45 43 43 42 42
high status (in %) 2 1 2 3 4 4 3
middle status (in %) 51 54 51 51 50 49 49
married (in %) 72 66 58 55 53 53 53
as married (in %) 7 7 6 7 8 9 10
divorced (in %) 11 11 7 6 7 8 8
widowed (in %) - - 11 12 13 13 13
30the care taken in the RLMS, income is notoriously di¢ cult to measure, certainly in Russia
1995-2003 with a large shadow economy. Moreover, expenditures are a better measure of
permanent income (and of the living standard), the crucial component in our theoretical
framework. In this pooled speci￿cation we introduce the logarithm of household size as
a separate variable. Expenditures, self-assessed health33 and quality of housing34 have a
highly signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on life satisfaction. Being unemployed has a signi￿cantly
negative e⁄ect. The same is true for the variable ￿wage arrears￿ , capturing the (at that
time in Russia common) phenomenon that wages were not paid in time, creating signi￿cant
income uncertainty. We ￿nd the usual U-shaped pattern with respect to age, with the
minimum level of life satisfaction reached at the age of 48. Being married or living as a
married couple increases life satisfaction. Nothing of this is surprising: these are basically
the regularities that are found in most of the happiness literature. Some other ￿ndings
are less common in the literature, but seem typical for Russia and have also been found
in the other work with the RLMS. Males are ceteris paribus more satis￿ed than females.
Being a member of a minority group (i.e. having a non-Russian nationality) also has a
positive e⁄ect.35 The e⁄ect of education is negative (after controlling for all the other
variables). This may have to do with frustrated expectations, but we will later see that
introducing interaction e⁄ects gives additional insights into this result. Note also that
33To some extent, self-assessed health raises similar issues with respect to the in￿ uence of aspiration
levels as are raised by subjective satisfaction (see, e.g., Groot, 2000; van Doorslaer and Jones, 2003).
Yet we follow the common practice in the happiness literature and use the questionnaire answers for
￿self-assessed health￿as if they yield a cardinal and interpersonally comparable measure.
34The RLMS-data contain a lot of information on housing characteristics: space in square metres,
availability of central heating, hot water, metered gas, sewerage, telephone, video and computer. They
also contain information on the price of the house. We ￿rst estimated on the pooled data a hedonic price
equation, including regional and year dummies (R2 = 0:73, all variables signi￿cant with the correct sign).
To correct for household size, we then calculated for each individual an index of the housing quality as
the value predicted by the hedonic equation after having substituted ￿equivalized space￿ for ￿space￿ .
These computed values for housing quality only change over time if the family moves, if one of the real
characteristics of the house changes or if the number of individuals living in the house changes. More
information about the estimation procedure and the results is available from the authors on request.
35We also introduced ￿being religious￿in the regression, but this variable turns out not to have any
explanatory power, most probably because of the high correlation with ￿minority￿ .
31the pattern of the time dummies most probably re￿ ects the general feelings of trust and
mistrust in the Russian economy (as suggested by Zavisca and Hout, 2005).
Table 2: Happiness estimation
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction
log expenditures 0.407***
(0.0193)
log household size -0.219***
(0.0390)
log expenditures 0.265*** 0.335*** 0.345*** 0.374***
(per consumption unit) (0.0241) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0375)
self-assessed health 0.511*** 0.319*** 0.435*** 0.432*** 0.460***
(0.0204) (0.0249) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0523)
house (in 100.000 rubles) 0.336*** 0.179*** 0.281*** 0.282*** 0.251*
(0.0254) (0.0463) (0.0826) (0.0826) (0.106)
unemployed -0.646*** -0.440*** 0.163 0.190 0.201
(0.0444) (0.0611) (0.136) (0.137) (0.186)
wage arrears -0.320*** -0.197*** -0.0840 -0.0882 -0.0508
(0.0275) (0.0366) (0.0678) (0.0680) (0.0810)
age -0.0822***
(0.00456)
age squared/100 0.0850*** 0.0737*** 0.0817*** 0.0810*** 0.0332
(0.00494) (0.0168) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0243)
married 0.271*** 0.0793 0.0929 0.0898 0.121
(0.0442) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.141)
as married 0.340*** -0.0331 -0.0250 -0.0228 -0.0730
(0.0538) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.146)
divorced -0.103 -0.314** -0.289** -0.291** -0.345*
(0.0557) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.151)
widowed -0.0787 -0.502*** -0.493*** -0.491*** -0.514**






32Table 2: Happiness estimation
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction
(0.0383)
higher educ. -0.0925** -0.119 0.244 0.239 0.172
(0.0319) (0.0808) (0.153) (0.153) (0.208)
high status 0.402*** 0.330*** 0.326*** 0.327*** 0.248*
(0.0667) (0.0967) (0.0969) (0.0970) (0.119)
middle status 0.172*** 0.262*** 0.260*** 0.262*** 0.295***
(0.0297) (0.0461) (0.0461) (0.0461) (0.0586)
1996 -0.0199 -0.185*** -0.188*** -0.189***
(0.0404) (0.0517) (0.0520) (0.0525)
1998 -0.0388 -0.357*** -0.380*** -0.400*** -0.122
(0.0431) (0.0703) (0.0722) (0.0753) (0.0789)
2000 0.341*** -0.0321 -0.0657 -0.0785 0.362**
(0.0405) (0.0937) (0.0957) (0.0962) (0.112)
2001 0.613*** 0.200 0.156 0.158 0.667***
(0.0398) (0.106) (0.109) (0.109) (0.134)
2002 1.068*** 0.660*** 0.603*** 0.613*** 1.180***
(0.0402) (0.121) (0.124) (0.124) (0.156)
2003 0.874*** 0.389** 0.322* 0.349* 0.964***
(0.0410) (0.136) (0.139) (0.139) (0.178)
ref. group expenditures -0.158* -0.204**
(0.0622) (0.0757)
ref. group unemployment -1.065** -1.524***
(0.333) (0.428)
log expenditures (lagged) 0.0376
(0.0272)
young X health -0.101* -0.0964* -0.0860
(0.0445) (0.0444) (0.0549)
young X expend 0.0350 0.0320 0.0316
(0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0239)
male X health -0.119* -0.120** -0.128*
(0.0466) (0.0465) (0.0587)
male X unemployed -0.335*** -0.334*** -0.384**
(0.101) (0.101) (0.131)
rural X health -0.112* -0.112* -0.0902
33Table 2: Happiness estimation
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction satisfaction
(0.0540) (0.0540) (0.0664)
rural X expend -0.126* -0.111* -0.124*
(0.0492) (0.0497) (0.0598)
rural X house 0.232* 0.235* 0.190
(0.107) (0.107) (0.132)
minority X health 0.113 0.119 0.151
(0.0667) (0.0667) (0.0852)
minority X expend -0.259*** -0.245*** -0.242**
(0.0628) (0.0621) (0.0781)
minority X unemployed -0.243 -0.219 -0.239
(0.134) (0.134) (0.173)
high educ. X house -0.196* -0.195* -0.205
(0.0815) (0.0814) (0.105)
high educ. X unemployed -0.457*** -0.460*** -0.530**
(0.132) (0.132) (0.177)
high educ. X arrear -0.152* -0.149* -0.167
(0.0754) (0.0756) (0.0905)
N 45863 40120 40120 40120 27887
(pseudo)R2 0.077 0.078 0.081 0.082 0.097
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
Let us now turn to the results for model B. This model is estimated with the simpli￿ed
conditional ￿xed e⁄ects ordered logit speci￿cation described in the previous section.36 All
the time-invariant individual characteristics are now taken up by the ￿xed e⁄ects. Since
we also include time dummies, we can no longer identify the linear e⁄ect of age. The
nonlinear e⁄ect is still captured by the quadratic term. As household size does not vary
su¢ ciently in our sample to estimate its e⁄ect separately, we have introduced expenditures
per consumption unit, with as equivalence scale the square root of the number of household
36We also estimated the model with the original Chamberlain (1980) approach. The coe¢ cients have
in general the same sign, but, as expected, are estimated less e¢ ciently.
34members. This equivalence scale is in line with the results of the pooled speci￿cation.37
A comparison of models A and B immediately shows that controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity through the introduction of ￿xed e⁄ects makes a substantial di⁄erence (as
in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). Most of the signi￿cant e⁄ects remain signi￿cant,
but become smaller in absolute value. This is in perfect agreement with the psychological
￿ndings pointing to the importance of personality traits for life satisfaction, and can also
be partly due to the presence of reverse causation (from satisfaction to functionings). From
our own theoretical perspective, neglecting this unobserved individual heterogeneity is not
defensible, and all the other results in this paper are derived for models with individual
￿xed e⁄ects. However, since most coe¢ cients go down in absolute value, the marginal
rates of substitution between the di⁄erent functionings (as given in eq. (6)) change less
than could be guessed when looking only at the e⁄ects on the individual coe¢ cients. In
this model, unobserved personality traits in￿ uence in the ￿rst place the frame of reference.
In a next step (model C) we introduce interaction e⁄ects to model intergroup di⁄er-
ences in preferences (see (5)). At this point it is convenient to have an idea of the main
functionings we want to put in the vector of explanatory variables Xi. Four elements
of this vector appear in almost all lists of functionings proposed in the literature: ex-
penditures (or income) per consumption unit, health, housing and (un)employment. We
include them all in fi. The fact of being (un)employed is only a primitive indicator of
labour market status. We therefore propose to include also in the list of functionings the
variable ￿wage arrears￿ , pointing to income and job uncertainty. We have more doubts
about the ￿occupational prestige￿ -variable. Would this be a functioning? Or is it better
seen as a variable capturing aspirations? We opt for the latter possibility, but this is
37The coe¢ cients for log expenditures (0.407) and for log household size (- 0.219) in model A imply an
equivalence scale parameter of 0.538, very close to 0.5. Note that we use the terminology ￿expenditures
per consumption unit￿to avoid confusion with our concept of equivalent income.
35obviously not a straightforward choice to make. It turns out that the distinction between
life dimensions and conditioning variables is not as clear-cut as it may seem at ￿rst sight.
Note that we are unable to introduce feelings (like happiness, sadness and others) in
the list of functionings because speci￿c information about them is not present, although
feelings ￿ the mood of the day￿ are likely to in￿ uence the answers to the satisfaction
question.
Consider the variable ￿education￿ : the level of education appears as such in many
lists of relevant dimensions of life, or it is at least closely related to proposed functionings
(or capabilities).38 Yet it has a negative e⁄ect in model B. Because it is hard to defend
that education as a functioning is negatively valued, i.e. that less education is perceived
as better, we did not include it in our list of life dimensions, and interpret the negative
e⁄ect as linked to changes in aspirations. However, it is possible that education is a
true life dimension (i.e. that individuals prefer higher education), but at the same time
also in￿ uences the frame of reference. If the two e⁄ects play together, it is impossible to
disentangle them with the available data.
And what about personal family situation (being married, divorced, as married or
widowed)? We are looking for a concept of well-being that is useful for policy analysis.
More speci￿cally it should be of help in evaluating the desirability of redistributive poli-
cies. For this purpose, it seems reasonable to focus on the dimensions of life that are
at the centre of the attention of public policies, and to compare individual situations in
these dimensions, at the exclusion of the life dimensions which are in the private sphere.
We therefore will treat personal family situation as a conditioning variable in our main
analysis, and not as a dimension of life that should be taken into account in the evaluation
of living standards. Certainly, one could take the opposite view and argue that ￿having
38To give an example: one of the capabilities on Nussbaum (2000)￿ s list is ￿being able to think and
reason in a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education￿ .
36harmonious personal relations￿is a crucial feature of a good life. This is even more true
if social circumstances make it impossible for individuals to have a normal family life.
The fact that these choices are di¢ cult does not in the least detract from the use-
fulness of our general approach. De￿ning what are the relevant functionings is in the
￿rst place an ethical and political choice. Our methodology makes it possible to derive a
relevant weighting scheme for all possible choices. For the time being we will illustrate
the approach with our initial choice of ￿ve functionings: expenditures per consumption
unit, health, quality of housing, (un)employment and wage arrears. In the next section
we will discuss the sensitivity of the calculated equivalent incomes for this speci￿c choice.
Even with our restricted set of ￿ve functionings, there remains a huge amount of inter-
actions to be estimated. We therefore simpli￿ed the model by keeping only the signi￿cant
interactions.39 The resulting estimates are shown in the third column of Table 2 (Model
C). Particularly interesting are the results for ￿unemployment￿and ￿education￿ . For both
variables the direct (linear) e⁄ect is no longer signi￿cant. However, unemployment has a
signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect for males, members of minorities and (very strongly) for the
higher educated. Wage arrears are also more important to the latter group. These results
suggest that education does not only have an e⁄ect on aspirations ￿ it also has a clear
e⁄ect on preferences. Moreover, we get a richer picture of the subtle e⁄ect of unemploy-
ment on life satisfaction. Further, we ￿nd that the young give a relatively smaller weight
to health, and a relatively larger weight to material welfare. Health is less important for
males and in rural areas, and more important for members of minority groups. Housing
matters more in rural areas, and less for the highly educated. All these results stand to
reason.
In a last step, we want to introduce more explicitly the possibility of changes in the
39For the estimation of these interaction e⁄ects we do not introduce age as a continuous variable, but
we opt to use a dummy variable ￿young￿ , taking the value 1 for individuals with an age below 40.
37frames of reference resulting from social interactions and/or from processes of adaptation.
The usual approach to model social reference e⁄ects is to introduce in the satisfaction
equation the average value of the relevant functionings for the social reference groups.
There is no consensus at all, however, about how to de￿ne these social reference groups.
In her analysis of the RLMS-data, Senik (2004) uses as a proxy for the individual￿ s refer-
ence group income the income predicted for that individual with an estimation including
education, years of experience, region, branch, age, sex and primary occupation code. She
￿nds that these predicted expenditures have a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on satisfaction,
and draws the conclusion that the positive cognitive (or information) e⁄ect dominates
the (negative) social comparison e⁄ect. This is indeed a very natural interpretation with
her de￿nition of the social reference variable. Frijters et al. (2006) use a geographical
de￿nition and introduce real average income, calculated separately for about 100 areas
in Russia. Its e⁄ect is insigni￿cant. We experimented with many di⁄erent de￿nitions of
the social reference groups (including clustering on age, gender, region, education, being
member of a minority, living in the same household) and our results of the reference group
e⁄ects are rather robust to the choice of de￿nition. As we want to focus on the social
comparison e⁄ect, we ￿nally opted for the geographical approach and introduce the mean
values for unemployment and for expenditures per consumption unit calculated at the
level of the 162 sites that are distinguished in the RLMS. The results are shown in the
fourth column of Table 2 (Model D). We ￿nd that with this geographical de￿nition the
comparison e⁄ect seems to dominate for expenditures: the e⁄ect is signi￿cantly nega-
tive. For unemployment, however, the informational e⁄ect seems to be the stronger of the
two.40 Remember that in these Russian data the in￿ uence of unemployment goes through
di⁄erent, sometimes rather subtle, channels.
40This result is di⁄erent from what is found in most previous work, see e.g. Clark (2003).
38Adaptation processes have been taken up in previous work by variables capturing
￿past expenditures￿ . As shown in the last column of Table 2 (Model E), we ￿nd a positive
(although not signi￿cant) e⁄ect for lagged past expenditures. This con￿rms the results
from previous work with the RLMS-data (Graham et al., 2004; Ravallion and Lokshin,
2002; Senik, 2004; Zavisca and Hout, 2005). There is therefore hardly any indication of
adaptation of aspiration levels to increases in material welfare, at least in the short run.
It is very well possible that the living standards of many individuals in Russia in the
period 1995-2003 were so volatile and uncertain that it was hard to adapt ￿ and, again,
in such a situation of deep uncertainty, expectations may also be more sensitive to all
kinds of informational signals. More work is needed to understand the intricate pattern
of adaptation of aspirations and generation of expectations. However, since the e⁄ect of
past expenditures is insigni￿cantly estimated with our data, we propose not to use the
results from model E and to work further with model D.41
We can illustrate the implications of model D with the indi⁄erence curves that are
implied by it. By way of illustration, Figure 5 compares the indi⁄erence map in the
health-expenditures space for young and old Russians living in an urban or in a rural
environment. The larger weight of health in the preferences of the old shows up clearly.
5.2 Equivalent incomes and satisfaction with life
Before we can calculate the equivalent incomes, there still remains the crucial question
of the choice of the reference values f for all functionings except the expenditures per
consumption unit. This is ultimately an ethical choice: we have to ￿x the reference values
41The dynamic speci￿cation of the model again raises di¢ cult issues with respect to the identi￿cation
of di⁄erences in preferences versus di⁄erences in aspiration levels. To give an example: it is very well
possible that for some of the variables included (e.g. expenditures per consumption unit) individuals
have well-de￿ned preferences over growth rates, rather than over levels. With the available data, it




























Figure 5: Indi⁄erence map in the health-expenditure space.
in such a way that they lead to acceptable distributional judgments. For our illustrative
purposes, we propose the following choices:
￿ as argued before, for health it is natural to take perfect health as the reference. If
two individuals are equally healthy, we can rank their quality of life on the basis of
their expenditures.
￿ a similar argument can be put forward with respect to employment. ￿Not being
unemployed￿is the natural social reference point for a comparison of well-being,
in that if two individuals are employed we can rank them on the basis of their
expenditures only. It would be strange to compensate one of the two if she claims
that she cares less than the other about being employed.42 However, take two
unemployed individuals with a di⁄erent income. In that case it makes sense to check
if one of the two su⁄ers more from the social and psychological stigma related to
42With the proviso that our data do not allow us to include a rich set of job characteristics.
40unemployment, implying that a ranking in terms of expenditures would not su¢ ce.
Note that we are not taking a position on psychological feelings of happiness here,
our aim being to respect individual preferences and views about the importance of
life dimensions.
￿ similar arguments lead to the conclusion that also for wage arrears the natural
choice of a reference is the situation without wage arrears.
￿ housing raises more di¢ cult issues, because it is not obvious what is the natural
point of reference. In our empirical work, we will use the median value of housing
in the total sample.
Using these values for f, the observations for the relevant functionings fi and our
estimates for the parameters ￿; # and ￿ from model D, we can now calculate the equivalent
incomes for all individuals in our sample (see (8)). In our approach, these equivalent
incomes are the preferred measure of individual welfare.
Table 3: Cross-tabulation of equivalent incomes Y ￿
it and equivalized expenditures.
equivalized quintiles of Y ￿
it
expenditures 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.39 0.36 0.16 0.06 0.02
2 0.20 0.29 0.26 0.19 0.06
3 0.16 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.14
4 0.14 0.11 0.22 0.27 0.26
5 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.23 0.52
Table 4: Cross-tabulation of equivalent incomes Y ￿
it and subjective satisfaction
subjective quintiles of Y ￿
it
satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.29 0.27 0.20 0.15 0.09
2 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.17
3 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.27
4 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.24 0.40
5 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.43
41To understand better the relevant features of these equivalent incomes, it is instructive
to compare them with the two most popular alternatives. The ￿rst is using expenditures
per consumption unit as such, i.e. considering only material welfare. This is probably still
the most common approach in applied work, partly because of the operational di¢ cul-
ties in implementing ethically richer and more attractive approaches. The second is the
welfarist alternative, which has gained so much popularity since it has become feasible to
measure subjective satisfaction (and/or happiness) with survey questions. Here welfare
is measured with the raw satisfaction measures. Tables 3 and 4 show for the year 2000
the cross-tabulations of Y ￿
it with expenditures per consumption unit Yit and with subjec-
tive satisfaction Sit.43 It is obvious that the di⁄erent concepts lead to di⁄erent rankings.
Equivalent incomes are far from perfectly correlated with expenditures per consumption
unit, and the correlation with subjective satisfaction is even very low.
Table 5: Intertemporal transition matrices of equivalent incomes Y ￿
it:
quintiles of Y ￿
it quintiles of Y ￿
it in 2000
in 1996 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.70 0.18 0.05 0.02 0.05
2 0.19 0.41 0.24 0.11 0.04
3 0.07 0.26 0.35 0.25 0.07
4 0.02 0.11 0.25 0.35 0.27
5 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.27 0.57
quintiles of Y ￿
i quintiles of Y ￿
i in 2003
in 2000 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.74 0.18 0.05 0.02 0.03
2 0.19 0.43 0.25 0.11 0.02
3 0.05 0.25 0.37 0.25 0.08
4 0.02 0.11 0.25 0.37 0.25
5 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.26 0.62
Tables 5 - 7 give an idea about the intertemporal mobility using the three welfare
concepts. Tables 5 and 6 show the quintile transition matrices from 1996 to 2000 and from
43The results for other years are similar.
42Table 6: Intertemporal transition matrices of equivalized expenditures.
quintiles of expend quintiles of expenditures in 2000
in 1996 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.42 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.07
2 0.29 0.28 0.19 0.14 0.10
3 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.17
4 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.24 0.28
5 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.37
quintiles of expend quintiles of expenditures in 2003
in 2000 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.48 0.25 0.14 0.08 0.04
2 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.14 0.09
3 0.13 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.18
4 0.08 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.24
5 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.27 0.44
Table 7: Intertemporal transition matrices of subjective happiness.
satisfaction satisfaction in 2000
in 1996 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.39 0.38 0.14 0.07 0.01
2 0.20 0.44 0.23 0.11 0.02
3 0.15 0.36 0.31 0.15 0.03
4 0.09 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.08
5 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.19
satisfaction satisfaction in 2003
in 2000 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.29 0.39 0.15 0.13 0.03
2 0.13 0.40 0.25 0.19 0.03
3 0.08 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.04
4 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.43 0.07
5 0.03 0.21 0.14 0.36 0.26
2000 to 2003 for our equivalent income concept and for expenditures per consumption unit
respectively. Table 7 describes the intertemporal mobility for the subjective satisfaction
measure. For this variable we could not make use of quintiles, because it is measured
on a discrete 1-5 scale. The rows and columns in Table 7 therefore refer directly to the
scale values. We show conditional probabilities per row, e.g. the ￿rst row in Table 7 gives
the probabilities that someone who was ￿not at all satis￿ed with his life in general￿in
1996 moves to one of the other values in 2000. As the distribution of the individuals on
43the subjective satisfaction scale moves up over time (see Figure 4), care is needed with
the interpretation of Table 7. Despite this di¢ culty, the message is clear. The welfarist
measure is by far the most volatile, our equivalent incomes are by far the most persistent.
More than 70% of the individuals in the lowest quintile of equivalent incomes remain in
that quintile in the later period ￿ the analogous number for expenditures per consumption
unit is between 40 and 50%, for happiness it is between 30 and 40% (but with the caveat
described before). An analogous picture is found for moves out of the highest quintile (or
the highest satisfaction value), where the caveat is no longer applicable.44 This result is
easily understood. It is to be expected that satisfaction measures are more in￿ uenced by
the mood of the day and by random events (captured by the disturbance term di) than
expenditures per consumption unit. Moreover, our equivalent income is to some extent
a weighted sum of ￿ve characteristics, some of which hardly change over time, while the
other two measures are determined exclusively by one variable. It is not surprising then
that the former is less volatile than the latter.
A better insight into the di⁄erences between the three approaches can be obtained
from Table 8. This table gives at the same time an idea about the sensitivity of our results
with respect to the choice of the elements in the functioning vector fi. Our sample for
2000 contains 1583 individuals with the lowest value (one) on the life satisfaction scale.45
The last column of Table 8 draws a portrait of these individuals. The ￿rst column draws
a similar portrait for the 1583 individuals with the lowest expenditures per consumption
unit. The other columns show analogous information for di⁄erent de￿nitions of the equiv-
alent income, i.e. di⁄erent vectors of functionings. Expenditures per consumption unit
coincide with equivalent incomes if they are seen as the only functioning - we call this set
44A simple ￿persistency￿measure (0.2*(trace of the transition matrix)) gives for equivalent incomes
.48 (1996-2000) and .51 (2000-2003). This is the expected number of individuals staying in the same
quintile. The analogous ￿gures for equivalized expenditures are .31 and .34 respectively.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































45I. When we add health as a second functioning, and consider the 1583 individuals with the
lowest resulting equivalent incomes, we get the picture in set II. The functionings vector
is then gradually extended while moving from the left to the right of the table. When all
variables, including the disturbance term, are considered as functionings, we are back in
the last column with the satisfaction measures.46
It is instructive to focus ￿rst on our three key concepts: expenditures perconsumption
unit (set I), equivalent incomes in our favourite de￿nition with ￿ve functionings (set V) and
subjective satisfaction (set XII). These columns are shown in bold. Who are the deprived
in these three approaches? The di⁄erences between the results for the welfarist satisfaction
measure and for the equivalent incomes are especially striking. The subjectively least
satis￿ed individuals have larger expenditures, a better health and a nicer house than
those with the lowest value of equivalent incomes. They are younger and better educated,
are more likely to be male and less likely to belong to a minority group. Clearly, subjective
satisfaction does not capture deprivation on the objective dimensions of life. The larger
correlation between expenditures per consumption unit and our concept of well-being also
shows up in this table. The main di⁄erence is with respect to health: health is valued
strongly in our well-being concept, certainly for a large fraction of (older and minority)
people. This e⁄ect is of course not taken up in expenditures per consumption unit The
same is true (to a smaller extent) for the non-monetary cost of being unemployed.
The other columns in Table 8 show the sensitivity of the results with respect to
the choice of the relevant functionings, with the ￿gure in italics indicating each time the
variable added. Most of the results speak for themselves. Taking up health, i.e. moving
from set I to set II, induces a strong shift in the characteristics of the most deprived.
Our decision of not including the occupational prestige variable did not have important
46All the results in Table 8 are derived with Model D (see table 2), i.e. we did not repeat for each column
the intensive search for potential interaction e⁄ects between functionings and conditioning variables.
46consequences, as the characteristics of the deprived according to sets V and VI are very
similar. Set VIII is an interesting one, because it includes all the variables pertaining
to social life (including education) in the set of functionings. As noted before, having
￿harmonious personal relations￿could be seen as a crucial feature of a good life. The
reference group variables (sets IX and X) raise another intriguing question about the
de￿nition of functionings. In our (preferred) set V, social comparisons are seen as an
aspiration and as a functioning. Yet one could also argue that comparisons to others
are directly related to the functioning ￿not being ashamed to appear in public￿ , one of
Sen￿ s favourite examples, which he relates to the work of Adam Smith. In our empirical
results, the e⁄ect of the reference group variables is minor. The introduction of age and
individual ￿xed e⁄ects (compare sets X and XI) is also relatively innocuous. In contrast,
it is striking that the inclusion of the disturbance term, i.e. the mood of the day and
the e⁄ect of short-run random events (the move from set XI to set XII), has a strong
e⁄ect on the identi￿cation of the deprived. This of course is in line with the results
on mobility shown in Tables 5 - 7 and supports the idea that ordinal preferences are
more trustworthy data than satisfaction levels. The sensitivity analysis in Table 8 is only
meant to be an illustration. As we noted, some of the sets of functionings are almost
impossible to defend from an ethical point of view. Yet, it shows convincingly that the
general approach with equivalent incomes can easily accommodate di⁄erent de￿nitions of
the functionings vector. More importantly, Table 8 indicates that the choice of concept
used for interpersonal comparisons does indeed matter ￿ and that our well-being concept
gives reasonable results for the identi￿cation of the deprived.
476 Conclusion
The recent happiness literature suggests that interpersonal utility comparisons are to
some extent possible. Yet this does not undermine the basic philosophical criticism of
utilitarianism (or, more generally, of subjective welfarism). A focus on subjective utility
may lead to a relative neglect of the real conditions of life. Moreover, valuing a life
is a re￿ ective activity that should not be reduced to the evaluation of hedonic states.
In fact, the psychological literature has also argued that ￿utility￿is a multidimensional
phenomenon and that it is crucial to distinguish a⁄ects and cognition. Therefore it appears
unlikely that we should witness a revival of primitive utilitarianism in the near future.
At the same time, however, the empirical work on happiness has drawn attention to
the importance of the non-material dimensions of life ￿ a welcome shift away from the
exclusive focus on material consumption.
We have argued that an adequate normative approach should indeed focus on the
vector of ￿functionings￿that describes the life of the individual in relevant dimensions.
The list of dimensions may include a⁄ects and feelings in addition to the objective cir-
cumstances of life. In aggregating these di⁄erent dimensions, one may seek to respect
individuals￿well-informed ordinal preferences, re￿ ecting their opinion about what is valu-
able in life. Such respect for preferences does not imply subjective welfarism. Quite to
the contrary, it is precisely when one wants to respect individual preferences that one
should not use the level of happiness or satisfaction as the measure of well-being, as these
happiness levels are in￿ uenced by adaptation and by changes in the aspiration levels.
If one discards ￿happiness￿or ￿satisfaction￿as an adequate aggregator of the di⁄erent
dimensions, one is confronted with a di¢ cult indexing problem when di⁄erent individuals
have di⁄erent preferences. We have described one promising approach to that problem,
which consists in calculating equivalent incomes. These correspond to the hypothetical
48incomes that would put individuals at the same welfare level, i.e. on the same indi⁄erence
curve, as in their actual situation, if they were at well-de￿ned reference levels for all other
dimensions. Equivalent incomes fully respect individual preferences. To calculate them,
we need knowledge about these preferences. We have described how the traditional life
satisfaction equations can be used to recover some of the information which is needed for
the calculations of equivalent incomes. We illustrated the method with RLMS-data for
Russia. It turns out that the picture of well-being obtained with equivalent incomes is
very di⁄erent from the picture that is obtained by focusing either on material consumption
or on subjective welfare.
Satisfaction surveys are only one possible source of data on ordinal preferences that
may serve to the computation of equivalent incomes. Other sources include revealed pref-
erences from observed choices and stated preferences. Each of these potential sources
of information su⁄ers from limitations. Our study of satisfaction surveys has shown, in
particular, that such data cannot simultaneously remove individual ￿xed e⁄ects linked to
adaptation and give us good information about preferences bearing on functionings which
are ￿xed although possibly unequal, like childhood histories or certain bodily character-
istics. Another important limitation is that we only measure the average preferences of
subgroups de￿ned by characteristics, ignoring additional personal variation. Finally, we
believe that the pollution of satisfaction answers by the mood of the day should be elim-
inated as much as possible by putting respondents in adequate conditions for carefully
thinking about the di¢ cult issues the questionnaires confront them with. While these
limitations are important, they do not impugn our general conclusion that happiness and
satisfaction surveys are a valuable source of information about individual well-being that
welfare economics should heartily welcome and intensively use.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let B ￿ Rm
+ denote the subset over which the Vector Dom-
inance Principle is satis￿ed. Consider two vectors f;f0 2 B such that neither f ￿ f0
nor f ￿ f0: One can then ￿nd R;R0 such that fPf0 and f0P 0f: By the Personal-
Preference Principle, (f;R;A;d) is better than (f0;R;A;d) and (f;R0;A0;d0) is worse
than (f0;R0;A0;d0): By the Vector Dominance Principle restricted to B, (f;R;A;d) is as
good as (f;R0;A0;d0) and (f0;R;A;d) is as good as (f0;R0;A0;d0): By transitivity, one
obtains a contradiction. This implies that for all f;f0 2 B, either f ￿ f0 or f ￿ f0: As B
is assumed to be such that for every (fi;Ri) there is f￿
i in B such that fiIif￿
i ; necessarily
B contains 0; is unbounded and arc-connected, and is therefore a monotone path in Rm
+:
Pick any f 2 Rm
+ and any R: By monotonicity of R, and the fact that B is a
monotone path, there is a unique f0 2 B such that f0If: By the Personal-Preference
Principle, (f;R;A;d) is as good as (f0;R;A;d): As a consequence, for all f;f0 2 Rm
+; all
R;R0; (f;R;A;d) is at least as good as (f0;R0;A0;d0) if and only if (f0;R;A;d) is at least
as good as (f0
0;R0;A0;d0); where f0;f0
0 2 B are de￿ned by f0If and f0
0I0f0: Therefore,
by the Vector Dominance Principle restricted to B; (f;R;A;d) is at least as good as
(f0;R0;A0;d0) if and only if f0 ￿ f0
0: This proves that pairs (f;R;A;d) are ranked by the
equivalence approach with B as the reference monotone path.
That every equivalence ordering satis￿es the Same-Preference Principle and the In-
di⁄erence Set Dominance Principle is easily checked. ￿
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